Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission

The Illinois Attorney General’s Office has continued to send letters to Fred Nance Jr. stating there is nothing they can do about these attorney’s actions or behavior. This office continues to put the responsibility for the attorney’s behavior on the shoulders of the court.

June 12, 2005

Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois
130 East Randolph Drive, Suite 1500
Chicago, Illinois 60601-1625

Re: Estate of Romeo Ashford – #00 P 1267
Attorneys Michael Bergmann #91139 & Theresa Christine Ceko #13122

Dear Sir or Madam:

I, Fred Nance Jr., am a pro se litigant in case number 00 P 1267, room 1806, Daley Center respectfully requesting an investigation into the professional conduct of Attorneys Michael Bergmann & Theresa Ceko. I believe the following Rules of Professional Conduct are applied here and being violated:

RULE 1.2 Scope of Representation
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.
(e) A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges or professional disciplinary actions to obtain an advantage in a civil matter,
(f) In representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another; (3) fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal
(g) A lawyer who knows a client has, in the course of representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses or is unable to do so, the lawyer shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged communication.
RULE 1.4 Communication (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
RULE 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

RULE 3.3: Conduct Before a Tribunal

(a) In appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: (1) make a statement of material fact or law to a tribunal which the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is false; (2) fail to disclose to a tribunal a material fact known to the lawyer when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; (6) counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent; (7) engage in other illegal conduct or conduct in violation of these Rules; (9) intentionally degrade a witness or other person by stating or alluding to personal facts concerning that person which are not relevant to the case; (11) refuse to accede to reasonable requests of opposing counsel that do not prejudice the rights of the client; (12) fail to use reasonable efforts to restrain and to prevent clients from doing those things that the lawyer ought not to do; (13) suppress any evidence that the lawyer or client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce; (14) advise or cause a person to become unavailable as a witness by leaving the jurisdiction or making secret their whereabouts within the jurisdiction.

RULE 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel (a) A lawyer shall not: (1) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.
RULE 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others: In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not: (a) make a statement of material fact or law to a third person which statement the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is false; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
RULE 4.3 Dealing With Unrepresented Person: In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
RULE 4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons: In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.
RULE 8.4 Misconduct (a) A lawyer shall not: (1) violate or attempt to violate these Rules; (2) induce another to engage in conduct, or give assistance to another’s conduct, when the lawyer knows that conduct will violate these Rules; (4) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (5) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In relation thereto, a lawyer shall not engage in adverse discriminatory treatment of litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others, based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status. This subsection does not preclude legitimate advocacy when these or similar factors are issues in the proceeding; (6) state or imply an ability to influence improperly any tribunal, legislative body, government agency or official; (7) assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that the lawyer knows is a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct; (9)(A) violate a Federal, State or local statute or ordinance that prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status by conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer. Whether a discriminatory act reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer shall be determined after consideration of all the circumstances, including (1) the seriousness of the act, (2) whether the lawyer knew that it was prohibited by statute or ordinance, (3) whether it was part of a pattern of prohibited conduct, and (4) whether it was committed in connection with the lawyer’s professional activities. (B) No complaint of professional misconduct based on an unlawfully discriminatory act, pursuant to paragraph (9)(A) of this rule, may be brought until a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction has found that the lawyer has engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory act, and that the determination of the court or administrative agency has become final and enforceable and the right of judicial review of the determination has been exhausted.

FACTS:

Attorney Bergmann is representing Julia Johnson in this matter. Attorney Ceko (GAL) is representing Romeo Ashford, a minor. Attorney Bergmann & Ceko are officers of the court. Attorney Bergmann and Ceko are not enforcing the court of order of June 27, 2000 in this matter regarding visitation. Attorneys Bergmann & Ceko appear to be neglecting their duties as lawyers, in that, they seem to be assisting, Julia Johnson, in violating, circumventing, and evading the visitation order issued on June 27, 2000. Attorney Bergmann and Ceko are not attempting to contact Julia Johnson to enforce the visitation order.

First, regarding the Rule 3.3. (2): On or about August 2, 2002 Nance filed an appeal with the 1st Judicial District Appellate Court of Illinois. On page 4 of the courts opinion it states “…The trial court entered an order directing that the issue of visitation by Fred Nance be mediated by the Cook County Department of Supportive Services. Subsequently, on June 27, 2000, the court entered an order allowing Fred Nance to visit Romeo on alternate weekends from Friday to Sunday and mandating that he pick up and return the child to Johnson for each visitation.”

Attorney Ceko never facilitated or obeyed the court order for mediation by the Cook County Department of Supportive Services. To cause undue harm and embarrassment Attorney Ceko, with the support of Attorney Bergmann and court ordered by Judge McGury, requested in her Guardian ad litem report of May 20, 2005 that Nance participate in a home study with the Cook County Department of Supportive Services to support his continued visitation, altering the court order of June 27, 2000.

The complainant in this matter, Fred L Nance Jr., has continuously contacted both attorneys by phone and motions to the court informing them that Julia Johnson is not in compliance with the visitation court order. Attorneys Bergmann & Ceko have refused to contact Fred by telephone after making an agreement last year (2004) that when matters of visitation arise instead of calling the police to enforce the court order, as Fred has done in the past, Fred should call Attorney Bergmann & Ceko to attempt to work out the differences. Attorneys Bergmann & Ceko violated this agreement.

Fred has filed various written motions in open court about this issue of visitation. Attorneys Bergmann & Ceko have refused to answer the written motions in writing, therefore, I have no written reply to illustrate to the ARDC or to the Appellate Court. On June 10, 2005, I presented this issue of the attorneys to respond with written replies to my motions to Judge Kathleen M McGury #1670 suggesting that if I had to take these issues to the Appellate Court, I would have to file a bystanders report, which would be arduous for me and the court system. Nothing was done by the court on June 10, 2005 to facilitate my immediate visitation.

Attorney Bergmann states that he does not have to answer the motions in writing. Judge McGury agreed with him. Attorney Bergmann instead has decided to respond orally to the motions. There is no court reporter in courtroom 1806. Fred has stated in open court that an oral response to the motions cannot be addressed with a written reply by Fred, nor can it be addressed by this entity because I have nothing in writing from the attorneys to the issues raised in the written motions to the court.

I believe there are ethical issues as well as legal and professional practice issues violated. Attorneys Bergmann & Ceko, through their non-actions to the court’s order in 2000 for Cook County Supportive Services intervention in the temporary guardianship and visitation issues, and the present motions filed in court by Fred, appear to be assisting Julia Johnson in violating the court order of June 27, 2005.

I will post this complaint on my website. Please examine the complaint accompanying this one submitted to the Judicial Inquiry Board. Regarding the Judicial Inquiry Board complaint, Nance is not suggesting this entity circumvent the proceedings by the Judicial Inquiry Board, but rely upon the Rules and Facts as if fully disclosed herein.

It is my belief that Judge Kathleen M. McGury and Attorneys Bergmann & Ceko are acting in a conspiracy and scheme to deny Nance’s visitation of the minor child, and to purposely discredit Nance’s efforts for relief through the judicial system.

cc: Judicial Inquiry Board
www.clickservices.org

June 28, 2005

Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
of the Supreme Court of Illinois
Ms. Mary Robinson, Administrator
One Prudential Plaza
130 East Randolph Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601-6219

Re: Case No. 05 CI 2826 (Michael Bergmann) & 2827 (Theresa Ceko)

Ms. Robinson:

I submitted allegations against Michael Bergmann and Theresa Ceko on June 12, 2005. This complaint was dismissed and closed without an investigation by Ms. Althea K. Welsh. These attorneys and their respective organizations retaliated against me on June 24, 2005 in open court for filing the complaint with the ARDC, and Attorney Ceko filed false information (petition) with the Court.

I talked to Theresa Waters on June 27, 2005 requesting clarity on Ms. Welsh’s last paragraph in her letter to me, which states “For the reasons stated above, this Commission will take no action with respect to your requests at this time.” I informed Ms. Waters I will file with the Court sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 against Michael Bergmann and Theresa Ceko. I informed Ms. Waters I would submit a copy of the complaint to the ARDC as a supplement to my original complaint.

Ms. Waters informed me the case was closed. She also informed me that anyone can file a complaint in court, and that the ARDC needed a Court order stating there was a violation. I informed Ms. Waters a Court order would support a conclusion. I asked her if everyone who files a complaint with the ARDC, files statements that are conclusions. It was my understanding the ARDC investigates allegations leading to conclusions, and that, conclusions come from a thorough investigation.

Therefore, I have filed a motion for sanctions (attached) pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137, which is also additional information for complaint #’s 2826 and 2827 requesting the case be re-opened and thoroughly investigated for violations, that is, omitting or overlooking nothing alleged by the complainant, Fred L Nance Jr.

July 1, 2005

Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois
Ms. Mary Robinson, Administrator
One Prudential Plaza
130 East Randolph Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601-6219

Re: Case No. 05 CI 2826 (Michael Bergmann) & 2827 (Theresa Ceko)

Ms. Robinson:

Attached is the letter addressed to the Honorable Judges Timothy Evans and Henry Budzinski regarding the continuing issues of this matter.

In addition, on July 1, 2005 my daughter and the minor child’s mother, Genesis Nance, called reporting the respondent in this matter, Julia Johnson, telling her “Ms. Ceko and I talked about the Affidavit you gave to your father. You are really in trouble now. You’re going to wish you had never gave him that.”

As you know, I did not send a copy of my motion that includes the Affidavit from Genesis to Julia Johnson as witnessed by the Notice of Motion. Julia Johnson could only have known about the letter in the discussion she reports to Genesis between her and Ms. Ceko.

I informed my daughter, Genesis, to look for retaliatory acts from Ms. Ceko but do not give up or shut up exposing the issues of these nefarious acts.

On July 2, 2005, I received a letter from Ms. Althea Welsh, Senior Counsel of ARDC Chicago, stating the ARDC has concluded this matter and the matters I am raising are appropriately addressed and resolved in the courts before any possible consideration by this Commission (letter attached). This is ludicrous. When does the Commission investigate? The Commission is a different entity. I am continuously complaining about ongoing matters that are being ignored by Judges. If the Commission ignores the issues and the Judges ignore the issues, there is no justice.

The public must be alerted to this lunacy. I have done nothing but attempt to litigate my issues, but “licensed” attorneys and “elected” Judges decide to issue out injustice with no one to prevent or stop them.

The continued harassment, intimidation, and oppression suffered through this judicial system, that is coordinated by a supervising Judge, Henry Budzinski, and the Chief Judge, Timothy Evans, is outrageous (this statement is not to suggest that Judges Budzinski and Evans are working in concert with the complaining issues), but what I do suggest is that no one is doing anything about it.

Therefore, as a social advocate for injustice I shall alert advocacy agents, such as Senators, State Representatives, and the like to assume responsibility for a social injustice system created by nepotism, racism, and indifferent treatment. The only way to combat such a system is through voting out laws and people who promote social injustice.

I have alerted the Daley Center Supervisor of the Probate Court, the Honorable Judge Henry Budzinski, and the Chief Judge, the Honorable Timothy Evans, of the indifferent treatment and the outrageous statements of Judge Riley, such as “…your Affidavit is meaningless in this court…; and I don’t want to hear from your witnesses…” and the other issues submitted. Judge Riley totally ignored me. He talked to the opposing counsels as if I was not even in the courtroom. Is this where I am supposed to get and see justice? To allow a sitting Judge to act in such a manner is disgraceful and shameful. Judge Riley made these statements in front of my children and my mother. My mother is about 74-years-old. I know this reminded her of the racism and just pure indifferent treatment she saw so prevalent in her day.

Ms. Althea Welsh reports that the ARDC has concluded its considerations of my issues. This is ridiculous and absurd. The non-actions of the ARDC promote this behavior. This is why Ms. Ceko and Ms. Benson continue to act in an unprofessional manner promoting issues that are unsupported getting their results from the Daley Center Probate Court Judges because of favoritism and friendships. It is obvious.

Mr. Obama, Judge Budzinski, and Judge Evans I am not the only one. It just so happens I am trained in advocacy work and I know how to address issues with my writings. Others address them in ways that our social world does not adhere too, and subsequently, the issues become mute because the address brought further havoc upon our social world.

Mr. Obama: When Justice O’Connor resigned, you presented President Bush with a challenge. WMAQ-TV refers to you making a statement about whom President Bush should think about appointing. You state, in part, “…just a judge who is in the mainstream of judicial thinking.” Is mainstream judicial thinking presented here, in your backyard? I challenge you to provide a template for President Bush of mainstream judicial thinking with a similar public statement of the issues presented here in this writing.

Who will step forward to stop the madness presented here? Who will step forward to address the issues saving our democracy and freedom? I believe each entity, that is, the Courts, the ARDC, the Judicial Inquiry Board, and Senator Barack Obama took oaths to uphold our Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Everything else flows from these works. The retaliation of Ms. Ceko and Ms. Benson, along with the Judges continues.

cc: Judicial Inquiry Board; Senator Barack Obama; Honorable Judge Timothy Evans; Honorable Judge Henry Budzinski; Operation Push; Cook County Department of Supportive Services; Reuters News; WMAQ-TV (Dick Kay); Associated Press; USA Today; Chicago Tribune

Judge Riley – Motion for Sanctions against Attorneys Ceko and Bergmann

On September 29, 2005 Judge Riley entered a three-part Court Order, which states, 1) That the guardianship of Julia Johnson over Romeo Ashford is discharged, instanter the estate be closed; 2) That Romeo Ashford is returned to his mother’s custody, instanter; and 3) That all pending orders are moot.

I filed this motion because the judge refused to hear the motion when I verbally requested it.

IN CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT – PROBATE DIVISION

ESTATE OF ROMEO NANCE-ASHFORD
A Minor

FRED L. NANCE JR., ) Honorable Judge James G. Riley
Petitioner, ) No. 00 P 1267
v. ) Docket: 282
JULIA JOHNSON, ) Page: 259
Respondent. ) Room 1809
NOTICE OF MOTION
TO: Theresa C. Ceko
Loyola University Community Law Center
25 East Pearson, Suite 1400
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Attorney Michael Bergmann
Chicago Volunteer Legal Services Foundation
100 No. LaSalle, Suite 900
Chicago, Illinois 60602

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on ____________, 2005 at _______ am, or as soon
thereafter as petitioner may be heard, he shall appear before the Honorable Judge James
G. Riley presiding in Room 1809 at the Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, and then and there will request the court to hear petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions against Loyola University Community Law Center and Chicago Volunteer Legal Services filed with the Clerk of the Court on June 29, 2005, a copy of which was served upon the parties above on June 29, 2005.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Fred Nance Jr., pro se petitioner certifies that I caused the above Notice and attached motion requesting a hearing to be served upon the parties above by hand-delivering a copy on __________, 2005 to their respective offices.

IN CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT – PROBATE DIVISION

ESTATE OF ROMEO NANCE-ASHFORD
A Minor

FRED L. NANCE JR., ) Honorable Judge James G. Riley
Petitioner, ) No. 00 P 1267
v. ) Docket: 282
JULIA JOHNSON, ) Page: 259
Respondent. ) Room 1809

MOTION REQUESTING A HEARING FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST LOYOLA UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY LAW CENTER AND CHICAGO VOLUNTEER LEGAL SERVICES FOUNDATION

Now Comes, Fred Nance Jr. Pro se petitioner, requesting this court hold a hearing
on petitioner’s motion for sanctions on Attorney Theresa C. Ceko of Loyola University Community Law Center and Attorney Michael Bergmann of Chicago Volunteer Legal Services Foundation filed with the Clerk of this Court on June 29, 2005. The petitioner submits the following:
The plaintiff is a “pro se” litigant requesting this Honorable Court should liberally construe his motion. Castro v. United States, 290 F.3d 1270 (2003) reports courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. See, e.g., Raineri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 100 (CA1 2000); United States v. Detrich, 940 F.2d 37, 38 (CA2 1991); United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (CA3 1999); Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 528, n. 1 (CA4 1970); United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (CA5 1983); United States v. McDowell, 305 F.2d 12, 14 (CA6 1962); Henderson v. United States, 264 F.3d 709, 711 (CA7 2001); McIntyre v. United States, 508 F.2d 403, n. 1 (CA8 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Eatinger, 902 F.2d 1383, 1385 (CA9 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly, 235 F.3d 1238, 1242 (CA10 2000); United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 625 (CA11 1990); United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d 689, 693 (CADC 1975) (per curiam).This Court may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, e.g., id., at 692—693, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963).
1. Petitioner filed a Response to Motion To Terminate Visitation and for Sanctions and Request for Sanctions against Loyola University Community Law Center and Chicago Volunteer Legal Services Foundation on June 29, 2005 with the Clerk of the Court.

2. On September 29, 2005, this court issued an order stating, 1) That the guardianship of Julia Johnson over Romeo Ashford is discharged, instanter the Estate be closed; 2) That Romeo Ashford is returned to his mother’s custody instanter; and 3) That all pending orders are moot.

3. Petitioner requested of the Court that his motion for sanctions filed on June 29, 2005 be heard.

4. The Court did not hold a hearing on the motion for sanctions stated above.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner request this Court review the motion referred to above filed with the Clerk of the Court and hold a hearing instanter.
Respectfully submitted,

Fred L Nance Jr.

Substitution of a Judge in Illinois; denied by Judge Harrison

Substitution of Judge Riley was denied.

IN CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT – PROBATE DIVISION

ESTATE OF ROMEO NANCE-ASHFORD
A Minor

FRED L. NANCE JR., ) Honorable Judge Harrison
Petitioner, ) No. 00 P 1267
v. ) Docket: 282
JULIA JOHNSON, ) Page: 259
Respondent. ) Room 1807

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: Theresa C. Ceko Attorney Michael Bergmann
Loyola University Community Law Center Chicago Volunteer Legal Services
25 East Pearson, Suite 1400 100 No. LaSalle, Suite 900
Chicago, Illinois 60611 Chicago, Illinois 60602

Genesis Nance

Please be advised on July 25, 2005 at 10:00 am, or soon thereafter as petitioner
may be heard, he shall appear before the Honorable Judge Harrison of the Probate Division presiding in Room 1807 at the Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, and then and there present petitioner’s Motion to find respondent in contempt of court, a copy of which is hereto attached and served upon the parties above.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Fred Nance Jr., pro se petitioner certify that I caused the above Notice and attached motion to be served upon the parties above by hand-delivering to Loyola University Community Law Center and Chicago Volunteer Legal Services; and to Genesis Nance by depositing same in the U.S. Mail on July 19, 2005.

IN CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT – PROBATE DIVISION

ESTATE OF ROMEO NANCE-ASHFORD
A Minor

FRED L. NANCE JR., ) Honorable Judge Harrison
Petitioner, ) No. 00 P 1267
v. ) Docket: 282
JULIA JOHNSON, ) Page: 259
Respondent. ) Room 1807

MOTION TO FIND RESPONDENT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT

NOW COMES, Fred Nance Jr. Pro Se Petitioner in this cause respectfully requesting this Honorable Court to find the respondent in contempt of court for violating the visitation court order of June 27, 2000. The petitioner submits the following to support his motion.

1. On July 15, 2005, petitioner’s motion for recusal of a judge was heard by Judge James Riley.

2. Judge Riley refused to recuse himself and refused to allow evidence presented by the petitioner for his recusal (letter dated January 12, 2001 to the Honorable Judge Henry Budzinski) to the record issuing an order to SOJ the case for a hearing to Presiding Judge Budzinski.

3. Judge Riley allowed courtroom staff, that is, Cook County Sheriff’s deputies to harass and intimidate me, such as surrounding the petitioner in the courtroom during the litigation process with no probable cause or provocation from the petitioner.

4. Petitioner requested Sgt. Vogwill give the names of the deputies that were present in the courtroom. Sgt. Vogwill refused and informed the petitioner that he should ask the deputies for their names.

5. Petitioner asked the Cook County Sheriff deputies for their names. The Cook County Sheriff’s deputies were Sgt. Vogwill (white female), Officers Keblis (white male), Covington (black female), and Olano (white/Hispanic male).

6. When the petitioner asked deputy Olano for his name, he aggressively and with an intimidating gesture requested the petitioner’s name stating he had to make out a report for the petitioner asking him for his name.

7. Sgt. Vogwill acknowledged and affirmed that deputy Olano had to file a report.
8. The petitioner is a black male. The attorneys in this case consist of a white male and two white females.

9. The petitioner complained to Presiding Judge Budzinski.

10. Judge Budzinski placed the case in “Random Electronic Process” and the process reassigned the case to Probate Calendar 01, which is Judge Harrison of the Probate Division in room 1807.

11. Presently, there are three (3) separate issues before this court.

12. Petitioner has two (2) issues before this court, that is, a motion to find respondent in contempt of the June 27, 2000 visitation order (filed on April 8, June 3, & June 20, 2005), and a motion for sanctions against the GAL and respondent’s legal team (filed on June 29, 2005).

13. Petitioner’s daughter, Genesis Nance, has a “Parent’s Petition to Discharge a Guardian” before the court to regain custody of the minor child Romeo Nance-Ashford (filed on April 20, 2005).

14. On June 24, 2005, the GAL filed a motion to terminate visitation and for sanctions against the petitioner, which has not been addressed by the court.

15. Petitioner’s motion to find respondent in contempt of court was presented first to this court, the motion by the petitioner’s daughter Genesis Nance was second, and the motion for sanctions was third.

16. On May 20, 2005, Judge McGury ordered the Cook County Department of Supportive Services (DSS) to conduct a home study of petitioner, respondent, and Genesis Nance.

17. DSS suggest that each person being interviewed during the home study have the minor child present during the process.

18. When Judge McGury suspended petitioner’s visitation, she prevented the petitioner from having the minor child present for the home study process.

19. The respondent and Genesis Nance have had their home study with the minor child present.

20. Due to the actions of Judge McGury, the petitioner has received disparate and indifferent treatment because he will not have the minor child present during his home study process.

21. Judge McGury had no basis of material fact to suspend the petitioner’s visitation rights under the court order of June 27, 2005.
22. On July 15, 2005, Judge Riley stated in open court that if petitioner’s daughter Genesis Nance prevails, petitioner’s motions are moot.

23. Petitioner stated in open court that his motions to find the respondent in contempt of court for violating the visitation court order of June 27, 2000 had nothing to do with petitioner’s daughter Genesis Nance’s motions before the court; and petitioner’s motion to find the respondent in contempt of court for the June 27, 2000 court order should be addressed before the motion of Genesis Nance if it is to determine petitioner’s motions as moot.

24. Petitioner stated in open court that hearing Genesis Nance’s motion to relieve the respondent of temporary custody first is the strategy of opposing counsels to possibly negate the issues of the petitioner and the issues raised by the petitioner with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission and the Judicial Inquiry Board.

25. On July 15, 2005, Judge Riley and opposing counsel, attorney Margaret Benson, acknowledged petitioner’s statements for the strategic move of this court.

26. Judge Riley violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63(1)(3)(4)(i)(8)(9).

27. Petitioner suggest if this court does not address his motion to find the respondent in contempt of court for the court ordered visitation dated June 27, 2000 first, separately and completely, it will create Federal questions of due process pursuant to the 14th Amendment, and possible Civil Rights violations.

28. Opposing Counsel has argued that Genesis Nance’s motion and the assignment of the Cook County Department of Supportive Services weighs heavily upon the matters before this court.

29. Petitioner rejects this argument and notion. Genesis Nance’s motion and the assignment of the Cook County Department of Supportive Services has nothing to do with the motion petitioner originally filed in April of 2005 requesting this court find the respondent in contempt of court for violating the visitation order of June 27, 2000.

30. The assignment of the Cook County Department of Supportive Services is a direct response from this court regarding the Guardian ad litem’s report, which has nothing to do with the petitioner’s motion to find the respondent in contempt of court for violating the visitation order of June 27, 2000.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays (1) this court hold a hearing on July 25, 2005
regarding the motion to find the respondent in contempt of court for violating the visitation order of June 27, 2000, (2) reinstate visitation for petitioner immediately, and/or (3) reinstate visitation for the purpose of DSS; or in the alternative schedule three (3) different dates for each motion filed presently with this court, such as 1st, a date for the motion to find respondent in contempt of court for violating the visitation court order of June 27, 2000; 2nd, a date for Genesis Nance’s motion; and 3rd, a date to hear the motion for sanctions.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63, in part

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULE 63

A. Adjudicative Responsibilities.

(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. A judge should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.

(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control.

(4) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that:
(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and
(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond.
(c) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge.
(d) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte communications when expressly authorized by law to do so.

(8) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.

(9) Proceedings before a judge shall be conducted without any manifestation, by words or conduct, of prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, by parties, jurors, witnesses, counsel, or others. This section does not preclude legitimate advocacy when these or similar factors are issues in the proceedings.

B. Administrative Responsibilities.

C. Disqualification.

(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

Substitution of a Judge in Illinois

IN CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT – PROBATE DIVISION

ESTATE OF ROMEO NANCE-ASHFORD
A Minor

FRED L. NANCE JR., ) Honorable Judge Riley
Petitioner, ) No. 00 P 1267
v. ) Docket: 282
JULIA JOHNSON, ) Page: 259
Respondent. ) Room 1809
NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: Theresa C. Ceko Honorable Judge Timothy Evans
Loyola University Community Law Center Daley Center, Room 2600
25 East Pearson, Suite 1400 Chicago, Illinois 60601
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Attorney Michael Bergmann Ms. Mary Robinson
Chicago Volunteer Legal Services Foundation ARDC Administrator
100 No. LaSalle, Suite 900 130 East Randolph Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60602 Chicago, Illinois 60601-6219

Cook County Department of Supportive Services Judicial Inquiry Board
Mr. Marcelino P. Jones, assigned social worker 100 West Randolph St.
69 West Washington Street, Suite 818 Suite 14-500
Chicago, Illinois 60602 Chicago, Illinois 60601-3233

Please be advised on July 5, 2005 at 9:00 am, or soon thereafter as petitioner may be heard, he shall appear before the Honorable Supervising Judge Henry Budzinski of the
Probate Division presiding in Room 1803 at the Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, and then and there present petitioner’s Motion to Recuse a Judge, a copy of which is hereto attached and served upon the parties above.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Fred Nance Jr., pro se petitioner certifies that I caused the above Notice and attached motion to be served upon the parties above by hand-delivering copy on July 5, 2005 to their respective offices.

IN CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT – PROBATE DIVISION

ESTATE OF ROMEO NANCE-ASHFORD
A Minor

FRED L. NANCE JR., ) Honorable Judge Riley
Petitioner, ) No. 00 P 1267
v. ) Docket: 282
JULIA JOHNSON, ) Page: 259
Respondent. ) Room 1809

MOTION TO RECUSE A JUDGE

Now Comes, Fred Nance Jr. Pro Se petitioner, requesting Judge James Riley’s recusal from this matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 63(A)(1)(3)(4)(8)(9)(B)(3)(C)(1)(a). Petitioner sets forth the following support for this motion, and request this Court review this action de novo.

The plaintiff is a “pro se” litigant requesting this Honorable Court should liberally construe his motions. Castro v. United States, 290 F.3d 1270 (2003) reports courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. See, e.g., Raineri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 100 (CA1 2000); United States v. Detrich, 940 F.2d 37, 38 (CA2 1991); United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (CA3 1999); Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 528, n. 1 (CA4 1970); United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (CA5 1983); United States v. McDowell, 305 F.2d 12, 14 (CA6 1962); Henderson v. United States, 264 F.3d 709, 711 (CA7 2001); McIntyre v. United States, 508 F.2d 403, n. 1 (CA8 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Eatinger, 902 F.2d 1383, 1385 (CA9 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly, 235 F.3d 1238, 1242 (CA10 2000); United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 625 (CA11 1990); United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d 689, 693 (CADC 1975) (per curiam).This Court may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, e.g., id., at 692—693, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963).

1. On June 24, 2005, the Honorable Judge Henry Budzinski recused Judge Kathleen McGury from this matter, petitioner stating Judge McGury had personal biases and prejudices stemming from petitioner’s complaint to the Judicial Inquiry Board on June 13, 2005 (order attached).

2. On June 24, 2005, Judge Budzinski assigned the case to Judge James Riley in courtroom 1809 (order attached).

3. On June 24, 2005, petitioner filed a motion (after Judge Budzinski’s order) to recuse a judge and immediately reinstate visitation of June 27, 2000 requesting it heard on July 1, 2005 in room 1809.

4. Judge James Riley has personal biases and prejudices concerning the petitioner, and personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning this matter.

5. On or about January 25, 2001, Judge James Riley was involved in this matter.

6. On July 1, 2005, petitioner informed Judge James Riley that petitioner filed a formal complaint with the Judicial Inquiry Board against him in 2001 or 2002 regarding this same behavior claimed in this motion (complaint actually filed with the Judicial Inquiry Board on January 25, 2001 and not stated for the record in court on July 1, 2005 because petitioner did not know the precise date until he called on July 1, 2005).

7. On July 1, 2005, Judge James Riley was swayed by partisan interest, that is, Attorneys Theresa Ceko and Margaret Benson (see attached letters to Judges Timothy Evans and Henry Budzinski).

8. On July 1, 2005, petitioner submitted an Affidavit from the mother, Genesis Nance, to Judge James Riley (attached).

9. On July 1, 2005, Judge Riley stated that the petitioner’s Affidavit was no good in his courtroom, statement part of the official record.

10. On July 1, 2005, petitioner presented 3 witnesses, that is, his 74-year-old mother, his stepdaughter, and the minor child’s brother for testimony regarding the present motion requested to be heard on July 1, 2005.

11. Judge Riley refused testimony from the petitioner’s witnesses.

12. Judge James Riley was not patient or courteous to the petitioner.

13. Judge James Riley did not accord to petitioner the right to be heard.

14. For the reasons stated, petitioner requested of Judge James Riley to recuse himself from this matter; petitioner submitting a recusal order to be signed by Judge Riley (attached).

15. Judge Riley threw the recusal order across his desk, at the petitioner, stating recusal denied, you already had one.

16. Petitioner informed Judge Riley that he could not hear his own recusal.

17. Judge Riley ignored the petitioner.

18. Attorneys Ceko and Benson have submitted to this court unsupported statements for the suspension of the petitioner’s visitation rights pursuant to the court order of June 27, 2000.

19. Attorneys Ceko has suggested to the court that her claims for suspension of petitioner’s rights to visitation are predicated on the minor child’s conversation with her.

20. Petitioner spoke to the minor child on July 3, 2005, and the minor child stated that he did not tell Ms. Ceko that he did not want to visit with his grandfather.

21. The minor child states that he goes to summer school, but does not attend summer school on Fridays.

22. Petitioner has agreed upon July 12, 2005 with the Cook County Department of Supportive Services for a home study with the minor child present.

23. Attorneys Ceko and Benson have not supplied the petitioner with contact information for the minor child to comply with the agreement with the Cook County Department of Supportive Services.

24. The court has ignored this visitation date of July 12, 2005 also.

25. Attorneys Ceko and Benson have persuaded the court to continue all matters until July 25, 2005 to avoid, moot, and challenges of petitioner’s motions for contempt of the court by the respondent, and the GAL’s unsupported testimony for suspension of visitation.

WHEREFORE, petitioner presents this motion to the supervising Judge, praying the Honorable Judge Henry Budzinski order: (1) recusal of Judge James Riley, (2) setting a court date for July 15, 2005 to hear petitioner’s motions finding respondent in contempt of court, (3) ordering the GAL and respondent to produce the minor child for testimony supporting the suspension of visitation on July 15, 2005, (4) reinstate visitation immediately, (5) ordering counsel for the respondent or the GAL to adhere to the Cook County Department of Supportive Services’ demand for a home study of petitioner and minor child by providing petitioner with the minor child’s new address and phone numbers for contact needed for petitioner’s home study date of July 12, 2005, and (6) whatever other remedies deemed appropriate and necessary towards the ends of justice.

Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board

This entity rarely acts on any issue presented to them. Their automy should be questioned. The Illinois Supreme Court governs and elects its members. Every reply letter I have received from them informs me they will not investigate or charge the judges listed in my complaint. Ms. Kathy Twine signs each letter I have received in the last 5 years refusing to investigate the allegations made in my letters.

June 13, 2005

Judicial Inquiry Board
Kathy D. Twine, Esq., Executive Director & General Counsel
100 W. Randolph St., Suite 14-500
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Re: Judge Kathleen M. McGury #1670

Ms. Twine:

I, Fred Nance Jr., am a pro se litigant in case number 00 P 1267, room 1806, Daley Center respectfully requesting an investigation into the character, behavior and ethical concerns and issues of courtroom #1806, which Judge McGury is presently the sitting judge. I believe the following Codes of Judicial Misconduct are being violated:

1. RULE 61 – CANON 1: A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
2. RULE 62 – CANON 2: A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities
3. RULE 63 – CANON 3: A Judge Should Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all the judge’s other activities. The judge’s judicial duties include all the duties of the judge’s office prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply:

A. Adjudicative Responsibilities.

(1) A judge should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control.
(4) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that:
(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for scheduling, administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits are authorized; provided: (i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and
(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond.

(b) A judge may consult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge’s adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges.
(c) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge.
(d) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte communications when expressly authorized by law to do so.
(8) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.
(9) Proceedings before a judge shall be conducted without any manifestation, by words or conduct, of prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, by parties, jurors, witnesses, counsel, or others. This section does not preclude legitimate advocacy when these or similar factors are issues in the proceedings.

B. Administrative Responsibilities

(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge.
(3) A judge having knowledge of a violation of these canons on the part of a judge or a violation of Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct on the part of a lawyer shall take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures.

C. Disqualification

(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

FACTS:

A court order was issued on June 27, 2000 reporting that maternal grandfather, Fred Nance Jr., is granted visitation of minor child Romeo Ashford every other weekend from 6:00 pm Friday to 6:00 pm Sunday. Nance has reported the violation of this court order numerous times by temporary guardian Julia Johnson. For violating the court ordered visitation for Romeo Ashford, this court has never reprimanded Ms. Johnson. Presently, the sitting judge, McGury, has not granted Nance his visitation per court order of June 27, 2000, nor has she held Ms. Johnson in contempt of court for violating the court order of June 27, 2000 outlined in Nance’s motions.

On or about August 2, 2002 Nance filed an appeal with the 1st Judicial District Appellate Court of Illinois. On page 4 of the courts opinion it states “…The trial court entered an order directing that the issue of visitation by Fred Nance be mediated by the Cook County Department of Supportive Services. Subsequently, on June 27, 2000, the court entered an order allowing Fred Nance to visit Romeo on alternate weekends from Friday to Sunday and mandating that he pick up and return the child to Johnson for each visitation.”

Attorney Ceko never facilitated or obeyed the court order for mediation by the Cook County Department of Supportive Services. To cause undue harm and embarrassment Attorney Ceko, with the support of Attorney Bergmann and Judge McGury, has requested in her Guardian ad litem report of May 20, 2005 that Nance participate in a home study with the Cook County Department of Supportive Services to support his continued visitation, altering the court order of June 27, 2000.

Judge McGury has allowed the courtroom staff, that is, Cook County Deputy Sheriffs’ and clerks, to degrade and humiliate Nance in open court (attached Sheriff’s complaint). Judge McGury has allowed attorneys Bergmann (attorney for Julia Johnson temporary guardian) & Ceko (GAL) to circumvent the processes of the court ordered violations, which Nance has raised in open court with written motions (attached). Nance has requested of Judge McGury that the attorneys respond in writing to Nance’s motions to avoid costly and arduous litigation with a bystanders report if needed for the appellate process, and to assist the pro se litigant in his attempts to argue his case. Judge McGury has decided that the attorneys do not have to file written responses to Nance’s motions. There is no court reporter in this courtroom. Leaving any objections to the oral reply of the attorneys up to a bystanders report.

On June 3, 2005, Nance filed a motion requesting that Judge McGury find guardian Julia Johnson in contempt of court for violating the court order of June 27, 2000, in that, on May 20, 2005 Julia Johnson requested in open court that she had made arrangements for the minor child to visit relatives out-of-town on the Memorial holiday weekend. Nance relinquished his visitation for Memorial Day, May 27, 2005, so that Johnson could take the minor child out of town to visit other relatives.

Johnson agreed that Nance would have two weekends in a row, that is, June 3rd & June 10th, 2005 for visitation. Nance claimed in his written motion that on June 1, 2005 Johnson left a phone message at Nance’s home stating that the minor child came back home but that Julia Johnson sent the child back out of town and that that the child will be out of town in Minnesota and will return sometime at the end of June 2005. Judge McGury decided that attorney Bergmann did not have to answer this written motion in writing to respond to it. Subsequently, Nance is not getting his court ordered visitation.
Nothing was done on June 10, 2005 to facilitate my immediate visitation.

On May 20, 2005, Judge McGury allowed attorney Bergmann to present an oral motion for supervised visitation. During the proceedings on May 20, 2005, Nance raised the issue of receiving visitation on May 13, 2005, and the minor child having socks on his feet that were extremely dirty, which Nance brought to court with him for public viewing. Attorney Bergmann objected and informed Judge McGury that the issue of the socks was not before the court, directing the court and pointing to Nance’s written motion.
Judge McGury sustained the objection and did not entertain the issue of the socks because it was not in Nance’s written motion. Yet, Judge McGury entertained attorney Bergmann’s “oral” motion for supervised visitation. This is a disparity of treatment toward a pro se litigant. This violates the codes mentioned above in this letter and pro se litigants’ pleadings as described in Supreme Court opinions.

Therefore, Nance respectfully request an investigation into the matters brought forth in this complaint, and the accompanying complaint filed with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). Regarding the ARDC complaint, Nance is not suggesting this entity circumvent the proceedings of the ARDC, but rely upon the Rules and Facts as if fully disclosed herein.

It is my belief that Judge Kathleen M. McGury and Attorneys Bergmann & Ceko are acting in a conspiracy and scheme to deny Nance’s visitation of the minor child, and to purposely discredit Nance’s efforts for relief through the judicial system. I will post this complaint on my website.

cc: Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission

Illinois Circuit Court Judge James Riley

The judicial system at the Daley Center in Chicago is corrupt through the use of nepotism and the old buddy program. The judges protect their own. An independent investigation of these judges needs to take place. The Chief Judges rarely act in these situations.

January 12, 2001

Honorable Judge Henry Budzinski
Supervising Judge – Probate Court
1803 Richard J. Daley Center
Chicago, Illinois 60602

Re: Character of the Courtroom 1806

Dear Sir:

I have written letters to you regarding the treatment and the violations of the rule of law that have taken place in this courtroom, and you have yet to address it or respond in writing to my letters.

I first wrote about Judge Braden and his misconduct in the courtroom. I write about Judge James G. Riley today. Judge Riley has taken Judge Braden place, due to Judge Braden retiring.

My case number is 00 P 1267, Docket #282, Page #259. I filed a motion for rule to show cause against the respondent, Julia Johnson, which was heard today in courtroom 1806. Judge Riley did not address my issues, i.e., I complained that the respondent, Julia Johnson, of minor child Romeo Nance-Ashford (my grandson) was sending the minor on visitation to me with soiled clothing and roaches in the clothes. I also complained about my visitation days being taken from me by the respondent. I asked Judge Riley to give me back my visitation days and to find the respondent in contempt of court for violating the court order of September 28, 2000.

I began to open a bag I had brought to court with the soiled clothes in it, and Judge Riley asked me, in a demeaning way, “did you bring dead roaches to court.” I told him no. I brought the soiled clothes. Judge Riley stated, “your motion talks about dead roaches. If you don’t have dead roaches I don’t want to see any clothes.” Judge Riley refused to look at my evidence. This violates the rule of law.

Judge Riley was very belligerent toward me. He screamed at me, in open court, requesting that I give him information about what he should do if he found the respondent in contempt of court. I lead him to my relief stated in the motion. Judge Riley stated that he did not have a copy of the motion. I told him that I gave a courtesy copy of the motion to his staff when I filed the motion. I gave him my copy of the motion. He did not return it to me.

Judge Riley badgered me about what were my issues on appeal in this matter. I gave him a courtesy copy of my appellate brief. He looked at it and returned it to me. He was not interested in what I was saying or to what I had in my motion. All he did was try his best to ridicule me in front of everyone in the courtroom.

In my opening statement to the court, I explained to Judge Riley that the respondent did not respond to my appellate brief, and that the guardian ad litem, Theresa Ceko, did file a response, and that there was no amicus curie brief filed. Therefore, the only thing before him was the motion I filed, and that the respondent and GAL should be allowed to refer to the issues addressed in the appellate brief. Judge Riley told me that he would decide what can be addressed in his courtroom. This violates the rule of law.

Judge Riley asked me “what are your issues on appeal”. I began to look in my appellate brief to locate the information, and evidently I was taking too long when Judge Riley stated in a loud obnoxious voice, “what are your issues.” GAL Ceko started telling Judge Riley that the only thing I was addressing on appeal was the court order of June 27, 2000. I objected. I told Judge Riley that I was addressing the whole court proceeding, and that the GAL should not be discussing this issue in this courtroom because it was improper. I informed Judge Riley that the GAL did not file a response to my brief in the appellate court, nor did she file an amicus curie brief in the appellate court, and, therefore, she could not address the issues of my brief in this venue. Judge Riley became heated and told me that he will determine who can say what in his courtroom. This violates the rule of law.

I requested that the respondent and the GAL respond to my motion in writing since there was no court reporter in the courtroom. The GAL requested to respond in writing. Judge Riley denied my request. Instead, he allowed the GAL to address the issues of the motion. I informed Judge Riley that she did not know what transpired between the respondent and myself, and that the respondent should be responding to my motion. I stated that the GAL is the guardian for the child. She is not the attorney for the respondent.

Judge Riley raised his voice again and hollered at me to tell him what I wanted him to do if he found the respondent in contempt of court. I told Judge Riley that I don’t respond to people who talk to me like that. I requested a date to file a bystander’s report of proceedings. Judge Riley ignored me and started looking in the direction of the GAL telling her how to write up his order for this proceeding. I again requested a date for the bystander’s report. Judge Riley ignored me and called the next case.

I went to his clerk to get a date and she began to treat me as if I did not exist. The clerk began to ask the GAL what date would she like. These continued nefarious acts, which violate my first amendment right to access the courts, is a continued attack to discourage me from litigating my case. This violates the rule of law.

Instead of finding the respondent in contempt of court for violating the court order, Judge Riley “technically entered” my motion and decided that he would “admonish” the respondent. There was nothing said about replacing my visitation days. Judge Riley would not let me litigate my case. I wanted to tell the Judge about the respondent sending the minor child on visitation with summer clothing in the winter. I also wanted to tell Judge Riley that I have bought new underclothes for my grandson that is never sent back, instead, I receive soiled clothes. Judge Riley continued to deny me access to the courts by not letting me litigate my case.

After the order was stamped, the GAL took the respondent a copy, who had retired to the hallway. The respondent told me in front of the GAL and the sheriff’s deputy that from now on she was not going to send any clothing with the minor child when he goes for visitation with me. I told the respondent that I had no problem coming back to court. This attitude is a direct result of the court not doing it’s job. A court order does not mean anything to the respondent, nor does it mean anything to the court.

Sir, an employee’s character, once demonstrated or exampled to his/her supervisor, mirrors the supervision of the supervisor, and this behavior by the employee once noticed by the supervisor, mirrors the character of the supervisor. If no action is taken, the supervisor condones the character of acts and responsibilities of the employee. Why should anyone adhere to the rule of law? If I had talked to Judge Riley the way he talked to me, I would be held in contempt of the court. Who holds Judge Riley in contempt of the court? Is there a different set of rules for the officers of the court that is not outlined Supreme Court Rules and Illinois Compiled Statutes?

The clerk finally gave me a court date for the bystander’s report of proceedings, after she affirmed that the GAL could be in court on the date she decided I could have. I was not asked if I could make it to court on that day. I have a life too. My court date for the bystander’s report of proceedings is February 9, 2001. There needs to me some monitoring in the courtrooms of the Daley Center. There may be others who have written; whom the character of those with supposed authority have discouraged with their nefarious acts that I have demonstrated in this letter. I would appreciate an answer from you on this issue. It’s only being respectful. Why does Judge Riley have a supervisor if the supervisor does not act? What are the responsibilities of a supervising Judge?

Judge Riley’s court order reads as follows: “That Fred Nance’s motion for rule to show cause is technically entered and the respondent Julia Johnson is admonished to provide clean clothes for the minor’s visitation with Fred Nance and to use her best efforts to comply with the previous visitation orders or to give Fred Nance ample notice of any changes.”

This order is ridiculous and ludicrous. It tells the respondent that she can change the visitation order at her whims without my agreement. It does not address my lost visitation privileges that were violated. What does Judge Riley mean when he says “technically entered”?

Therefore, I am attaching my motion to this correspondence. I am sending copies of this correspondence to following people listed below. Judge Riley would not have addressed any attorneys as he addressed me. There was no reason for him to deny looking at my evidence. There was no reason for him to ridicule me in open court. There was no reason for him to disrespect me.

cc: Donald P. O’Connell, Cook County Circuit Court Chief Judge
George H. Ryan, Governor
James E. Ryan, Illinois Attorney General
Lisa Madigan, Senator
John Cullerton, Senator
Larry McKeon, State Representative
Judy Erwin, State Representative
Helen Shiller, Alderman 46th Ward
Jesse Jackson, Operation Push

COMCAST Corporation

September 26, 2005

COMCAST Corporation
Brian L. Roberts, Chairman & CEO
1500 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Re: COMCAST Business Practices

Mr. Brian Roberts:

I, Fred L Nance Jr., have cable and telephone service with COMCAST Corporation. My phone number is 708-339-6737. I am writing to report the service I have received and/or not received from COMCAST, and also to inform the public so they may make informed decisions on whether COMCAST provides the service they prefer.

A Sales Representative of COMCAST in the Chicago area has informed me that a customer is eligible for a “promotion” every sixteen (16) months. Many customers may not be aware of this eligibility. I am not sure of what COMCAST’s promotional techniques include, but COMCAST’s current customers should be aware of this eligibility, as well as the general public.

It was also told to me that COMCAST presently has a telephone service promotion for $39.99 for 12-months, which the Sales Representative reports has all of the services I presently have with COMCAST. COMCAST also has a telephone service where customer’s can answer their phones from their television sets. COMCAST service reps do not know of this service. I attempted to access this service. I attempted to access the telephone service where one can access the telephone from their television. No one I talked to can explain this availability or if I can access the service.

I am scheduled for telephone repair service today, September 26, 2005. I was told by COMCAST customer service I would have to be available for their service person from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. This is ludicrous. I attempted to explain my telephone issue when the customer service rep interrupted me and reported I would have to pay $10.00 for the service needed. I informed the service rep I had an inside wire maintenance agreement with COMCAST, which I pay a monthly charge to COMCAST. The service rep informed me I would have to pay the charge anyway if I wanted the repair.

I am sorry for only introducing the following managers’ first name, but your employees report they are not to give any other identifying information. I have a problem with companies operating in this manner.

When reporting my issue of the 8:00 am to 5:00 pm repair service to Rod, a manager of COMCAST stationed in Texas, he informed me this morning that COMCAST service call time frames are scheduled according to priority. Rod reports that my need for a repair to a jack in my home may not be a priority to others who are need of service on a particular day and that is why I have to be “readily” available from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. I talked to Andrea, Customer Advocate Specialist in Eastern Canada, before I talked to Rod explaining my issue of waiting all day for a repair to one of the jacks on my telephone service. Andrea informed me that having more than one jack in my home was a luxury. I asked Andrea what did her comment have to do with my service waiting time. She did not respond to my comment.

I called again and spoke to Josh, a manager in Texas. He informed me not all COMCAST customers are subjected to the time frame for repair as I report above. Josh reports some time frames are constructed according to the area one lives in and the State. Why isn’t the time frame for repair service uniform? Josh informed me he scheduled a customer for repair service this morning from 7:00 am to 8:00 am.

I requested the telephone promotion of $39.99 for 12-months from Andrea. Andrea reports the $39.99 for 12-months is only for new customers. Rod could not find this promotion. Josh could not find this promotion. I asked Rod and Andrea for the names and addresses of their corporate officers. Both informed me they were not at liberty to give the names and addresses. I had to research the information on COMCAST’s website.

I am a social advocate for the disadvantaged and disenfranchised (http://www.clickservices.org/). Many individuals do not know what avenues to take when addressing their issues with Corporate America. COMCAST customer service representatives should be more sensitive to a customer’s need for information and access.

At the time of this writing (3:45 pm CST), no one from COMCAST has visited my home. I have been informed I am not eligible for the promotion of $39.99 for 12-months. Also, no one I have mentioned or talked to from COMCAST has been able to explain appropriately and succinctly my eligibility for the telephone service where I can access a phone call from my television. Please assist me as a customer of COMCAST. Please provide some sort of training for your customer service reps to avoid the aforementioned. Please respond in writing. Thank you.

cc: Ralph J. Roberts, Director COMCAST Communications
Stephen B. Burke, COO
D’Arcy F. Rudnay, Vice President Corporate Communications
David L. Cohen, Executive Vice President
http://clickforjusticeandequality.blogspot.com/
http://www.complaints.com/

September 26, 2005

COMCAST Corporation
Brian L. Roberts, Chairman & CEO
1500 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Re: COMCAST Business Practices – Part II

Mr. Brian Roberts:

At approximately 5:10 pm on September 26, 2005, Ms. Shireese called me reporting my service call for today had been routed to a technician assigned to the Southwest suburban area, noting Aurora as a point of reference. Shireese stated she needed to re-schedule my appointment for the next open date, which was October 3, 2005 between the hours of 8:00 am to 5:00 pm for service because this technician could not service my area due to the distance he had to travel.

I informed Shireese this was not acceptable. I informed Shireese I had been waiting all day for a technician to report to my residence, and now you are asking me to wait on a technician another day from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. I asked her why didn’t someone call me earlier about this routing error. Shireese stated she had just discovered the error and was calling me with the information. I asked to speak to a supervisor.

A supervisor named Jeff discussed the issue with me. I asked Jeff for his location. He informed me he operated out of the Windy Point station, Schaumburg, Illinois. Jeff said there was nothing he could do about the scheduling date. He stated he would contact his manager, Mr. Andrew Henderson, on Tuesday, September 27, 2005, to see if they can arrange services with a routing manager or operations manager. I informed Jeff I would be sending this follow-up letter to you, and copying it to everyone I listed in my first letter regarding this issue.

cc: Ralph J. Roberts, Director COMCAST Communications
Stephen B. Burke, COO
D’Arcy F. Rudnay, Vice President Corporate Communications
David L. Cohen, Executive Vice President
http://clickforjusticeandequality.blogspot.com/
www.complaints.com

W.O.W. Cable

People need to know how WOW operates and their limits on reasonable contact with those in authority.

August 10, 2005

WOW INTERNET, CABLE, PHONE
Ms. Colleen Abdoulah, President & CEO

Re: Installation of Cable Service on acct. # 8855110370058121

I, Fred Nance Jr., am writing this letter to complain about the character and behavior of one of your employees who provides installation service. The phone numbers I will refer to regarding your employees in this correspondence were gathered from my cell phone caller ID.

I do not have an address to mail a hard copy of this complaint. I searched the WOW website and could not find an address. I attempted contact of the dispatcher in my area through a telephone representative of WOW, but was informed that the dispatcher’s number could not be given out. Therefore, I am left with contacting the President & CEO. It appears to me that something is wrong with this picture.

On August 8, 2005 I had a scheduled 2:00 pm to 6:00 pm (CST) installation for Cable service with WOW. Mr. Rolando called me from phone number 773-640-8496 at approximately 12:08 pm (CST) stating he had a cancellation and would like to come by my home for the installation. I informed him that I was located in downtown Chicago at the time and could not come home until my scheduled appointment. Mr. Rolando stated that he would attempt to get a colleague to fulfill my order between 2:00 pm to 6:00 pm since I could not receive service at this time.

An employee of WOW called me from phone number 773-858-6204 at approximately 2:38 pm (CST) stating, “This is the service rep for WOW, where are you?” I said, “I am at the corner store. I am 5 minutes away. I am in my car now on my way to my house. Are you at my house?” The service rep stated, “I am in the area. Where exactly are you?” I stated, “I am on my way home. I will be there in about 3 minutes.” The service rep stated, “Exactly where are you?” I said, “Where are you?” The service rep stated, “I asked you a simple question.” I said, “Who do you think you are talking too? Where are you?” The service rep stated, “I asked you a simple question. Where are you?”

I asked the service rep for his name. He refused to give me his name. He refused to tell me his location. When I arrived home the service rep was still on the phone asking me where am I. The service rep was not at my home. I informed the service I was calling his company to report this issue. I informed the service rep he was not welcomed in my home. I informed the service rep if he could not give me his name he could not come into my home. I ended the conversation and called WOW.

I called 866-496-9669 and talked to Eddie. I explained my issue as stated above. Eddie put me on hold stating he was calling the dispatcher with the complaint. Eddie came back to our conversation stating a different service rep is in route to my home and that the service rep who called me from 773-858-6204 was not coming to my home. I asked Eddie where was he stationed in case I needed to refer to our conversation. He informed me he was stationed in Colorado Springs.

2 WOW service reps appeared at my front door at approximately 3:45 pm. I asked the service reps if one of them was the person who insulted me on the phone, and if they were the one he was not welcomed in my home. The Hispanic guy, Rolando, stated he talked to me earlier about 12:00 pm about the early service. I told Rolando that this call was about 2:30 pm. The other service rep stated he did not talk to me at all over the phone.

As the service reps starting working on my service outside my house, I called the number from my cell phone, which is 773-858-6204, attempting to see when the phone rang if it belong to the service reps at my home. The phone’s answering service came on with the person stating his name, which I believe is Lafeet or something that sounds like that.

When the service rep Rolando entered my house to service the inside, I asked him what was his partner’s name. Rolando said Lafeet or something like that. I did not want to question him or ask him to spell his colleague’s name. I informed Rolando that I did not want his colleague to enter my home. I informed Rolando that I did not want his colleague to do any service to my home. Rolando went outside and informed his colleague of what I said. I did not see the colleague anymore. I explained the statement above to Rolando and why I did not want his colleague in my home. Rolando was very apologetic stating that he had no knowledge of the conversation I had with Lafeet. Rolando also stated he thought it strange when his colleague called him off from another job to tell him he had to come to my house with him.

On August 9, 2005 at approximately 2:15 pm (CST) I talked to Sharon #SLH in Texas. I explained the issues above. I asked for contact information for you, Ms. Abdoulah. Sharon did not have an address for you. Sharon advised me to go to http://www.wowway.com/, go to the Fast Active Menu and scroll down to Management Team. I asked her for the dispatcher’s phone number in my area. She stated she could not give out that information. I requested her supervisor call me back. I gave Sharon my contact information, that is, 708-921-1395. No one called me back.

Therefore, I will cancel my service with WOW on or about August 17, 2005 when I pick back up my previous service with COMCAST. I cannot have service from a company that operates in this manner. My issues with COMCAST are not this severe. I needed a line in my living room but the service rep did not have time to do it stating because he was called away from another job that was incomplete. I will post this complaint at

http://www.complaints.com/ and at http://www.clickservices.org/.

Markham Illinois’ Public Defender’s Office

This is an unfair practice. These people want to retaliate against you for reporting issues such as this. I reported it to the Public Defender’s office because it was an unfair practice.

July 29, 2005

United States Senator
Barack Obama
230 S. Dearborn St., Suite 3900
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Re: Public Defender Assignment

Senator Obama:

I, Fred Nance Jr., am still addressing your comment about President Bush’s Supreme Court choice suggesting the President pick someone who uses “mainstream thinking.” I had an experience at the Markham Courthouse I think you should be aware of. I would not be writing to you about this issue if I had not been disrespected by the Public Defender’s office, specifically, Ms. Ross and Mr. Kendall Hill. I believe these individuals use “mainstream thinking” as part of their judicial processes.

I attended court, under subpoena, for a car accident where I am the victim. There was a guy, who has been assigned a Public Defender, who stated to the Judge in room 205 that he is a Professor of Social Work teaching at Indiana University with 2 DUI’s at issue. There is something wrong with this picture. This person is not “white” or “black.” He appeared to be Arabic or Indian. I am sure there are plenty of “African-Americans” who need the service of the Public Defenders’ office who have employment disqualifying them from the services of the Public Defender’s office.

I spoke briefly to his Public Defender about this matter. Her name is Ms. Linda Perez. She informed me that she was appointed by the Judge in room 205 to this case. She states that I must take it up with him. We talked in Mr. Kendall Hill’s office.

I requested to see the supervisor of the Public Defender’s office. I spoke to Ms. Ross. She informed me that I was addressing this issue in the wrong place. I asked to speak to her supervisor. She told me that he was not in. I asked the intern who was the supervisor. Ms. Ross informed me that Mr. Kendall Hill was the Chief. Ms. Ross left. I continued talking to another Attorney getting information about the Public Defenders’ hierarchy. Mr. Ross came back to the front. I gave my business card to Ms. Ross as she was writing Mr. Hill’s name on an office business card. Mr. Ross was standing in the waiting room. She tossed my business card in the window of toward the intern. Ms. Ross then informed me that Mr. Hill said he would see me in 20 to 30 minutes. This was at 11:30 am. I waited until 12:15 pm informing Ms. Ross that I would send him a copy of this letter.

Mr. Kendall Hill did not have time to discuss this issue. Therefore, I am writing you and copying others with this issue. It is my hope that someone who is informed of this matter, through this correspondence, would bring a solution so that this issue does not have the appearance of indifferent treatment.

There were many people who witnessed and heard the statement of this person who was the defendant. The court reporter and police officers commented on the fact that this person had a Public Defender being a Professor of Social Work teaching at Indiana University.

I hope someone contacts me by phone or letter giving information toward the solution to this issue. I am still researching the person’s name with Indiana University.

cc: Honorable Judge Timothy Evans
Honorable Judge Ronald C. Riley
Mr. Edwin Burnette, Public Defender
Mr. Kendall Hill, Chief Public Defender of the 6th Municipal District